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There are three main reasons why the Dutch works council presents a case
of comparative interest. First, we can study three different councils in the same
country. Like Italy, the Netherlands displays discontinuity in the tasks, func-
tion, and organization of employee representation in firms. The mandatory
works council of 1950 was designed as a channel of communication between
employer and employees and was embedded in a paternalistic view of labor-
management relations. The law of 1971 gave the works council a dual role:
representation of employee interests was added to the task of contributing to
the optimal functioning of the firm. The reform of 1979, finally, removed the
employer from the council's chair. Advisory and co-determination rights were
broadened, and a larger array of legal instruments was placed in the council's
hands. In short, the Dutch case presents us with an opportunity to study the
effects of institutional reform within the relatively invariant structural, institu-
tional, and cultural context of one country.
The second reason for a closer inspection of the Dutch case is that it allows
us to evaluate the impact of institutional intervention under adverse economic
conditions. The 1979 reform came on the eve of what became the worst eco-
nomic and employment crisis since 1945. How did the new "employee-only"
works council assert itself? What was its contribution in defining and de-
fending employee interests? How did the new council affect the performance
of Dutch businesses?
A third point of interest derives from the contrast with Germany. In their
current forms, works councils in the two countries are rather similar in their
strong institutionalization and legal facilitation. The systems of industrial rela-
Jelle Visser is senior lecturer in sociology at the Universiteit von Amsterdam.
7980 Jelle Visser
tions in the two countries are also quite comparable. Collective agreements are
negotiated between trade unions and employers' associations at the level of
industrial branches and take precedence over local (firm-level) agreements,
though there are now more exceptions to this situation in the multinational firm
sector in the Netherlands. But unlike the German union movement after 1945,
Dutch unions did not overcome their ideological and religious divisions, and
in most firms and industries we find three or more unions. Moreover, since the
decline in overall union density from nearly 40 percent in the mid-1970s to 25
percent at the end of the 1980s, the Netherlands constitutes a case of weaken-
ing unionism, if not union weakness. In particular, in manufacturing, where
the German density rate is double the Dutch rate, we should be able to evaluate
the differential impact of weak and divided unionism on the functioning and
effectiveness of what is otherwise a similar institution.
In addition, the coincidence of the council reform of 1979 and the severe
decline in unionization invites a closer inspection of crowding-out effects. Do
statutory works councils, by offering publicly available, free protection, re-
place trade unions as private associations of workers? Does voting for union
candidates in works councils substitute, in the minds of workers, for member-
ship in trade unions? Does management try to substitute unions for councils?
Are there examples of unions that, by having access to mandatory works coun-
cils, find it easier to organize particular groups of workers?
I start with an overview of the legal and organizational aspects and then,
after a brief historical digression, proceed with an analysis of the changing
relationship between councils and employers. Next, I focus on variations in
influence among works councils and discuss the "logic of exchange" between
management and council. This is followed by a closer look at the organiza-
tional and contextual variables explaining these differences. Additional atten-
tion is given to the interaction with trade unions. The question of whether the
role of the council in collective bargaining has been enhanced in the context
of decentralized industrial relations and human resource management will be
addressed next. The final section is devoted to an evaluation of the costs and
benefits of works councils for employees, management, trade unions, and so-
ciety.
4.2 Tasks, Rights, and Organization of the Council
4.2.1 Consultation, Co-determination, and Monitoring
Under the Works Council Act of 1979 (Wet op de Ondernemingsraden),
1
works councils have three main rights: consultation, co-determination, and
1.1 follow the latest available English edition: Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegen-
heid (SZW—Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment), Works Council Act (The Hague, May
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monitoring. When and how these rights apply, and how conflicts must be re-
solved, is carefully specified. The main rights of the council read as follows:
Consultation (Section 25)
"The entrepreneur shall give the works council the opportunity to tender
advice on any proposed decision" in the case of transfer of control of (parts
of) the enterprise; control, mergers, or takeovers of other enterprises; termina-
tion of operations or plant closure; significant reduction, expansion, or change
of activities; major changes in the organization or division of powers within
the enterprise; change in the location of production; employment or lease of
temporary staff; major investments; major capital loans; and assignments given
to outside consultants or experts on any of the above issues. Council advice is
also needed on proposals concerning the dismissal or appointment of members
of the board of supervisors. The right of consultation in case of mergers, take-
overs, and use of outside consultants does not apply if one of the firms involved
is located outside the Netherlands.
Co-determination (Section 27)
"The entrepreneur shall require the approval of the works council for every
proposed decision by him to lay down, amend, or withdraw" a regulation as
referred to in article 1636j of the Civil Code;
2 pension insurance, profit-
sharing, or savings schemes; arrangements of working hours and holidays; job
assessment; health, safety, and welfare at work; rules concerning hiring, firing,
and promotion; staff training; staff assessment; industrial social work; job con-
sultation; grievance handling; and the position of young workers. The obliga-
tion to ask approval "shall not apply if and insofar as the substance of the
matter in question has been regulated for the enterprise in a collective
agreement."
Monitoring (Section 28)
"The council oversees the compliance with the regulations, by collective
agreement, public statute or otherwise" concerning the terms of employment
and the health, safety, and welfare of workers. The council is also required to
oversee the implementation of the law and to promote general public policy
objectives with respect to job consultation, employee involvement, prevention
of discrimination, equal treatment of men and women, and integration of hand-
icapped persons in the enterprise.
4.2.2 Consultation Procedures, Information, and Sanctions
In 1979, while removing the employer from the council's chair, the legisla-
tive officials took great care to specify proper consultation procedures between
2. This refers to general rules of conduct for employees and to terms of the contract of employ-
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employer and council in order to prevent a radicalizing impact on labor-
management relations. Accepting the council's main function of representing
employee interests, the law clearly discourages overt expression of conflict and
promotes a problem-solving approach through improved communication and
mutual accommodation of interests.
Employer and council must meet within two weeks if either party so de-
mands. A minimum of six consultations (overleg-vergaderingen) is required
every year. The council is not allowed to publish its advice or disapproval with-
out prior consultation with the employer. Neither must the employer reject the
council's advice, objection, counterproposal, or initiative without discussion
with the council. Council and employer will together determine the agenda and
decide who will chair the joint meeting. The law further prescribes that the
employer, or the board of directors, will designate a permanent and fully man-
dated representative for these consultations (the so-called overleg-bestuurder).
Under section 31, "the entrepreneur is obliged to provide, in good time, the
works council and its committees with all the information that they reasonably
require in order to perform their work," in particular, at least twice a year, with
data on the firm's financial and economic position, its long-term strategies, and
its social and personnel policies. The council may engage an outside expert at
the firm's expense to check financial statements or develop counterproposals.
In the case of major changes involving matters under section 25, the employer
must seek the council's advice "at a time which will allow it to have a signifi-
cant impact on the decision," and the council "shall be furnished with a list of
reasons for the decision, its expected consequences for the employees of the
enterprise, and the measures proposed in response" to these. This information
shall be given in writing.
If there is disagreement, the law wants to ensure that all avenues for conflict
avoidance are exhausted. At least one consultation meeting between the coun-
cil and the employer must take place before a conflict can be taken to external
authorities. In particular, if the council wants to advise against a proposed deci-
sion covered by section 25, or wants to withhold approval under section 27, it
may do so only after the matter has been discussed in a formal meeting with
the entrepreneur. The works council must specify its reasons in writing.
In the case of council objection, the employer "shall be obliged to postpone
implementation of his decision with one month" unless the council agrees to a
shorter delay. In the meantime, the council may lodge an appeal with the Com-
pany Law Chamber of the Court of Appeal in Amsterdam, "on the grounds that
the entrepreneur in weighing the interests involved could not in all reasonable-
ness have arrived at his decision." The court can order the employer to rescind
his decision and may prohibit the entrepreneur from carrying it out. In the case
of a co-determination issue under section 27, the council's position is stronger,
although the legislation has stopped short of giving the council a right of veto.
Decisions that have not been given council approval are invalid, but the em-
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deems the council's refusal "unreasonable" or if the proposed decision "is
based on important organizational, economic, or social considerations."
Finally, the council does not have to wait until the employer asks its advice.
Under section 23 of the law, the council may take the initiative and "submit
proposals on which it considers consultation desirable." The employer is
obliged to consider the proposal in a formal consultation meeting. Oddly, the
law does not specify sanctions if the firm ignores a council initiative.
4.2.3 Further Legislation Regulating Dutch Firms
Several other laws should be mentioned to describe the legal and institu-
tional context in which Dutch firms operate (for a full treatment of Dutch busi-
ness law see Schuit et al. 1988). Under Dutch company law, a limited liability
company above a certain size must have a board of supervisors. Board mem-
bers are appointed by the shareholders through a system of "controlled co-
optation." Unlike German workers, Dutch workers have no representation on
the supervisory board. However, the works council is entitled to give its advice
on any appointment, may veto a proposed appointee, and may suggest alterna-
tive candidates. Company staff and union officials are excluded from positions
on the board. The board's main power is the appointment and dismissal of the
board of directors, which is the actual management of the firm and the firm's
legal agent.
A typical feature of the Collective Dismissal Notification Act of 1975, the
nonstatutory Code of Conduct for firms of the same year, and certain sections
of the Civil Code is the role given to the unions in addition to the rights vested
in works councils. The firm must notify the union of collective dismissals af-
fecting 20 or more employees. To encourage negotiations and the development
of a "social plan," the director of the Regional Manpower Service must wait at
least one month before granting permission for the dismissal, unless unions
and management agree otherwise. Unions may, but need not, involve the works
council in these negotiations. The Code of Conduct concerning company
mergers was developed by the tripartite Social Economic Council and is super-
vised by one of its committees. Trade unions are to receive prior information,
under conditions of secrecy, and must be involved in the drafting of a social
plan. They will also help define the involvement of the works council, as re-
quired under section 25. Trade unions can also appeal to the Company Law
Chamber for an independent audit of the firm's finances, condition, and opera-
tions if they have legitimate reasons to suspect gross misconduct and other
remedies have failed.
The latest piece of relevant legislation, increasing the council's monitoring
tasks, is the Health, Safety and Welfare at Work Act, which was phased in
between 1981 and 1990. The act specifies certain requirements for working
conditions that must be met in the workplace. Dutch works councils are func-
tionally comprehensive, and monitoring adherence to health, safety, and wel-
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area to special committees, except the right to start legal proceedings. Ac-
cording to a survey of the largest private sector union, the Industriebond FNV
(IB FNV), there are some 700 health and safety committees in the about 1,000
industrial firms with 50 or more employees that the union organizes (IB FNV
1990). Their main task is to draw attention to hazards at work and find methods
of prevention. Dutch works councils, or health and safety committees, have no
authority to stop dangerous work processes. This decision can only be taken
by the state's labor inspectors, following a request from the works council. It
remains to be seen whether the law will be effectively enforced, but one may
expect legal effectiveness to increase through the involvement of the councils
and health and safety committees, given the advantages of a customized and
negotiated application of general norms. Union and firm training of health and
safety committee members has increased in recent years.
4.2.4 Domain and Coverage
The Works Council Act applies to all firms with 100 or more employees. In
1981 a new law regarding worker participation in small firms was enacted,
extending the obligation to create works councils, but with restricted rights,
3
to all firms with between 35 and 99 employees working at least one-third of a
full-time working week. Also, this Small Enterprise Participation Act places
employers with very small firms, between 10 and 34 employees, under the
obligation to organize at least an annual consultative meeting. These laws
apply to the private sector, including subsidized activities or activities under
public control (e.g., railways or hospitals). The sizes of the domains of the
various laws is shown in table 4.1. The General Civil Servants Statute regulates
the participation rights of civil servants and public employees, including the
election of departmental committees in local and central public administration
and public utilities, with special statutes for the police, the military, and educa-
tional institutions.
This chapter is only concerned with the "hundred-plus" councils, in firms
and establishments with 100 and more employees. Even so, variation in size
and organization is large, from 100 employees to the around 90,000 employees
of the largest private firm in the Netherlands, the Post and Telecommunications
Office (PTT). In 1990, the hundred-plus councils covered 55 percent of all
employees in the private sector, accounted for 55 percent of national output,
and represented 50 percent of the value added of all private businesses (Eco-
nomisch Instituut voor het Midden- en Kleinbedrijf [EIM] 1990). Of the 4,500
hundred-plus firms in which works councils are mandatory, almost one-third
are in manufacturing, accounting for about two-thirds of total manufacturing
employment.
3. E.g., the right of advice is restricted to decisions on major changes in location, organization,
or employment that affect at least one-quarter of the workforce. No obligation exists for the em-
ployer to delay decisions for at least one month in case of disagreement.85 The Netherlands: From Paternalism to Representation
Table 4.1 Works Council Laws and Firms Covered
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Sources: Centraal Bureau voor Statistiek (CBS—Central Bureau of Statistics), Statistisch Zakboek
1992 (The Hague, 1992); and data provided by the EIM.
Note: Table reports rounded figures (January 1991) for private sector excluding agriculture. Em-
ployees are those working a minimum of 15 hours per week.
4.2.5 Coverage
Under Dutch law, employers must set up a council, and no prior initiative of
employees, trade unions, or third parties is required. The employer may, how-
ever, ask for an exemption, which can be granted for a maximum of five years
after hearing the trade union(s) as representative(s) of the workers. Law en-
forcement is a task of the state and is entrusted to a Labor Inspectorate. Looise
(1989) calculates that works councils exist in 83 percent of the hundred-plus
firms and for 87 percent of the employees in firms of this size. In firms with
35 to 100 employees, coverage has risen from 20 percent in 1981, when works
councils were still voluntary in such firms, to 41 percent of the firms and 45
percent of the employees in 1985. Coverage in the small-firm sector has since
stagnated at around 50 percent (Van der Heijden 1991). In our survey, con-
ducted in May 1991, 19 percent of the workers in small establishments (those
with fewer than 35 employees) reported the existence of consultation meetings
or councils, compared with 82 percent of the workers in larger establishments.
Coverage increases with establishment size, reaching 95 percent of employees
in establishments with 1,000 or more employees (van de Putte, Visser, and van
Rij 1991). Least covered in small and large firms are employees in commercial
and financial services (Teulings 1981; Huiskamp and Risseeuw 1988); within
the small-firm sector, coverage is lowest in construction, in family firms, and
in services employing mainly low-skilled workers (Dekkers, Calhoen, and
Andriessen 1989).
Since we are dealing only with hundred-plus firms, firm size cannot be the
only explanation for the differences in council coverage shown in table 4.2.
Teulings (1981) found a large difference in council coverage between firms
(91 percent) and establishments (31 percent). This difference is most clearly
present in financial institutions.86 Jelle Visser
















































Sources: Labour Inspectorate, Registratie enquete instelling ondernemingsraden 1984 (The Hague:
SZW, mimeograph); author's calculations.
Note: Figures are for private sector excluding agriculture. N = 3,627.
4.2.6 Multiplant Firms and Council Organization: Some Examples
The law is flexible as to whether firms with several plants should set up more
than one council. Before the latest amendment to the law, in April 1990, the
minister was to decide in case of disagreement. Current law encourages self-
regulation with the possibility of taking matters to court. As a rule, council
organization follows the structure of the firm. If the firm is centralized, one
works council with an extensive committee structure may suffice;
4 in a decen-
tralized or multidivisional company, or in a holding company, each establish-
ment usually has its own works council. Together they elect the divisional
councils, from which a central works council is elected. Between 10 and 15
percent of all works councils in the Netherlands are group or central works
councils.
Examples of a very elaborate council structure are found at PTT and at mul-
tinational firms like Philips, Unilever, and AKZO.
5 Many large banks, insur-
4. One difference between a works council and a committee is that the council can be a legal
party and sue the employer.
5. PTT was privatized in 1989. It has a holding company structure with five subsidiaries, of
which the Post Office, with 60,000 employees in 5 districts, and Royal Dutch Telecom, with 30,000
employees in 13 districts, are the most important. In 1991 PTT had 22 works councils (one for
each district, one for each of the three smaller subsidiaries, and one for the holding company),
supported by an extensive committee structure. There were two group works councils, one for
Telecom and one for the Post Office, elected by and from the works councils. Together with the
works councils of the other subsidiaries and the council of the holding company, they elect the
central works council. The result is that individuals may be member of three councils. The central
works council meets every week and meets with management every two weeks, and also meets in
a number of study groups. Members of the central works council spend most of their working time
on council business. In total, works councils at PTT involved some 1,500 members, or one council-
lor for every 63 employees. Philips, which currently employs about 45,000 employees in the Neth-
erlands, had in the late 1980s 80 works councils in its Dutch establishments, 10 divisional councils,
and one central works council.87 The Netherlands: From Paternalism to Representation
ance companies, the Dutch railways, and the national airline, KLM, have only a
works council at headquarters. In April 1990, demands to decentralize council
organization at the Amsterdam-Rotterdam Bank (with 11,000 employees and
two councils) and at the railways (28,000 employees and one council) were
rejected by the employers. In his last decision on the matter, the minister sup-
ported the employers' point of view. Of the major multinational firms, Philips
is most critical of indirect elections of the central works council since voting
alliances of union members in the works councils at the establishment level
tend to produce a union majority in the central councils. In the 1992 works
council elections Philips will implement its plan to abolish the divisional coun-
cils, and the members of the central works council will be chosen in direct elec-
tions.
Another bone of contention is the separation of national and international
activities. Employees working in the international departments at Philips head-
quarters in Eindhoven are not represented by the central works council. They
have a works council of their own with almost no union representation. The
central works council argues that this denies it access to the strategic center of
the firm and that it must deal with managers of Philips Holland, who have
insufficient authority. Management argues that if it included the international
division under the central works council, it would have to apply a similar coun-
cil structure to its Belgian, German, Italian, and other employees. After its
short-lived and unhappy experiment with an international works council in the
early 1970s, Philips is adamant in its opposition to European works councils.
Other Dutch multinationals appear to share this view (e.g., Unilever) and have
also rejected European councils (Visser and Ebbinghaus 1992).
4.2.7 Works Council Elections
Regular elections of their members by and from the workforce is an im-
portant source of strength for councils. As a rule, elections take place every
three years, but since 1990 council and employer may agree that elections are
to be held every two or every four years. All mandates are renewable. Unlike
in France, Spain, and Germany, works council elections in the Netherlands are
not synchronized and are scheduled differently in each firm. Hence the public
visibility of these elections is small.
Turnout averages about 75 percent (Koene and Slomp 1990), but the average
conceals considerable variation among firms. Teulings (1981) found that in 40
percent of the council elections turnout had been 90 percent and more, in 30
percent between 70 and 90 percent, and in 30 percent less than 70 percent.
Huiskamp and Risseeuw (1988) report that in half of the 444 councils in their
survey, conducted in 1988, turnout had been over 77 percent. In our survey of
May 1991, 55 percent of all "permanent" employees in the private sector said
that they had voted in the "most recent elections," 26 percent had not voted, 16
percent said that there had been no elections (because of lack of candidates),
and 4 percent had not (yet) been eligible to vote. This translates into a turnout88 Jelle Visser
of 68 percent of the eligible workforce, excluding the firms with no elections
but including elections in smaller firms with 35 to 99 employees.
Dutch works councils are categorically encompassing and include blue-
collar workers as well as clerical, technical, and managerial staff. There are no
guaranteed seats for any functional group, but elections are frequently orga-
nized on a departmental or functional basis. The franchise extends to all em-
ployees who have worked in the firm for at least six months; council and man-
agement may agree to include employees who work for the firm but are not
directly hired by it. Council members must have worked at least one year with
the firm. The size of the council increases with employment, from 7 council
members in firms with 100 to 199 employees, to 9 for up to 399 employees, 11
for up to 599 employees, 13 for up to 999 employees, and 2 more with each
1,000 additional employees until a maximum of 25 members is reached. Larger
numbers are possible by mutual agreement. The average Dutch works council
has between 9 and 10 members (Teulings 1981; Heijink 1986; Koene and
Slomp 1990).
The Dutch works council is a firm and not a union institution. Among the
firm's permanent employees, union and nonunion members have the same
rights. However, with respect to electing council members, the law gives recog-
nized trade unions a slight advantage. A "union list" of council candidates is
automatically recognized. Members of nonrecognized unions or nonunionized
workers must collect a minimum of 30 signatures from among the firm's em-
ployees before they can present a list of candidates. Recognition is automatic
for any union affiliated with one of the major confederations, but nonaffiliated
unions may be recognized in certain industries or firms.
4.2.8 Facilities and Rights of Council Members
Protection of council members, exmembers, and candidates is another major
source of council independence. The employer must ask special permission
from the cantonal court if he wants to dismiss any of the above, and protection
is given for two years after membership on the council. Council members are
granted paid leave for meetings, training, and preparation. The number of
hours and the amount of other facilities, such as office space and secretarial
assistance, are to be arranged between council and employer. The council is
entitled to hire experts at the employer's expense and may have a budget of its
own. The council can constitute itself as a legal party, represented through its
elected president, and may sue the employer. Legal expenses are to be paid by
the employer, within negotiated limits and only after prior notification. Works
councils cannot be held liable for the costs of legal proceedings.
The law guarantees a minimum of 60 paid working hours or five days of time
off per year per council member. A representative survey of works councils in
the mid-1980s showed that the average council member used 27 hours per
month for council activities (Looise and Heijink 1986; Looise and de Lange
1987). About half of these were working hours paid by the employer. Council89 The Netherlands: From Paternalism to Representation
presidents spend 37 hours on average, of which half are compensated, though
in larger firms with over 500 employees it is not unusual to find a full-time
council president. The average council meets 10 to 11 times per year; in addi-
tion, it consults seven times per year with the employer. Just over half of the
councils had office space and the support of a typist; one-third had also the
support of a staff secretary and their own budget, averaging 30,000 guilders
($18,000) per year in 1985; one-fourth had an additional budget for hiring
experts, though fewer councils had actually engaged expert advisers. Three out
of four councils received regular training, about five days per year, organized
and paid through the Joint Training Board for Works Councils, which is funded
by employers. It goes without saying that these averages may be misleading
since we are dealing with firms having from 100 to 90,000 employees, though
measured by establishment the variation is smaller.
4.3 Changing Relations with Employers
In 1979 the legislature found it hard to disown the Dutch legacy of vertical
corporatism in which the employer, as "head of the enterprise," was also chair-
man of the works council. After years of preparation and political horse trad-
ing, a compromise was found in which the emancipation of the council was
tightly knit into a tissue of consultation. The employee-only council, with in-
creased rights and authority, became firmly embedded in a highly formalized
set of rules which privilege compromise and problem solving over bargaining
and articulation of conflict. A brief historical overview will help explain the
complexities of current law and practices.
4.3.1 Paternalistic Councils
The works councils of 1950 satisfied in all but one aspect the ideal type of
the paternalistic council as defined by Rogers and Streeck (chap. 1 in this vol-
ume). They were not designed to encourage the independent expression of
worker interests, but "to contribute, with due recognition of the autonomous
function of the employer, to the best functioning of the enterprise" (Act of May
4, 1950). A representative role for the council elected members on behalf of
their constituency was excluded because representation was seen as the sole
prerogative of trade unions, and because it would have contradicted the view
of the firm as a community.
The 1950 works councils legislation did not, however, result from employer
or state initiatives to forestall union organization in the workplace, even though
it did have that effect. The act was part and parcel of an institutional framework
of organized consultation with which labor and capital tried to break with the
prewar past. From the viewpoint of organized labor it was the least important
ingredient of the postwar compromise, the basic component of which was the
recognition of trade unions as a legitimate party at all levels of decision making
above the firm, in exchange for unions' acceptance of management's right to90 Jelle Visser
manage and an undertaking to refrain from union activity in the firm (Wind-
muller 1969; Visser 1992a).
The idea of social partnership was embodied in the joint Foundation of La-
bor, which was pivotal in the execution of statutory wage policy between 1945
and 1963. Pessimism about the viability of European economies and of democ-
racy abounded, and there was widespread distrust of conflict and market solu-
tions. The works councils of 1950 were only the third layer in a neocorporatist
framework, at the top of which stood the tripartite Social-Economic Council,
and in the middle a bipartite industry board, or product board, in each industry.
The unions believed that this arrangement, a compromise inspired by Catholic
social thought, would give them sufficient influence in socioeconomic decision
making. In their view, uberbetriebliche Mitbestimmung, to use the German
expression, exercised through representative organizations of employees
would make interest representation at the firm level redundant. Moreover, the
unions were anxious to defend their newly gained right to collective bar-
gaining. If indeed the council of 1950 was an embodiment of paternalist ideol-
ogy, unions were part of this ideology.
It is characteristic of the spirit of the 1950 legislation that it placed all firms
with more than 25 employees under an obligation to set up a works council
without ever mentioning sanctions against employers who did not comply. The
philosophy behind this striking omission was that cooperation with unwilling
employers would be useless (Fase 1969, 28). The fact of the matter is that until
the early 1960s few employers felt a need to install works councils. The unions
kept complaining about lack of cooperation of employers but suffered equally
from lack of enthusiasm among their members, in spite of large educational
campaigns (Smid, Sprenger, and Visser 1979). In the course of the 1960s more
councils were established, but now the unions began to worry about "wildcat
cooperation" between council and management. The variable best explaining
the presence of a works councils was the existence of a modern personnel or
labor relations department, which at the time were proliferating in Dutch in-
dustry (Buitendam 1979). As might be expected, firm size was the contingency
that explained most of this variation (Drenth and van der Pijl 1966; Lammers
1968). Predictably, the factor highlighted in later studies was the age of the
council itself: the longer it had existed, the more established its position, the
more active and sophisticated its use of rights (Hovels and Nas 1975;
Andriessen, Drenth, and Lammers 1984).
In neglecting the firm as an arena of interest representation the unions had
miscalculated, though it took almost two decades before this became evident.
With the exception of a few sectors—agriculture, retail, catering, and food
production being the most prominent—the industry boards remained insig-
nificant. But increased international activities, vertical integration, and hori-
zontal mergers of firms followed the opening of European markets with the
creation of the European Economic Community in 1958, and decisions on cap-
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by management and owners of capital without any input from workers. This
became painfully clear in the merger wave of the mid- and late 1960s, which
was followed by an upsurge in plant closures. To check tendencies of wildcat
cooperation among the councils, as well as in response to growing criticism
from an increasingly radical membership, trade unions in metal engineering
began to organize networks of "trusted members" in the firm, similar to the
Vertrauensleute in West German industry. The unions also encouraged the
practice, emerging in these years, of organizing so-called preparatory sessions
of elected works council members prior to the official works council meeting
chaired by the employer.
4.3.2 Dual Councils
The new Works Council Act of 1971 did little but adjust the law to reality.
It raised the threshold for councils to firms of 100 or more employees and
recognized the preparatory sessions of the worker members of the council. But
it also left the employer in the council's chair. Works councils were now given
a dual mission: they were to "organize consultation with and representation of
the firm's employees... in the interest of the optimal functioning of the firm"
(Works Council Act of 1971). The consultation rights of councils were
strengthened, and council members gained protection against dismissal and
were offered training and other facilities to be paid for by the employers out of
a common, industrywide fund. Employers who ignored or curtailed the coun-
cil's rights had to face legal sanctions. The number of councils rose rapidly:
from 48 percent of all hundred-plus firms in 1972, to 75 percent in 1974, to 85
percent in 1975, more or less the percentage today (all figures based on Labor
Inspectorate reports).
From the start the new dual councils, paternalist and representative at the
same time, came under pressure. In 1973, during a major strike in the metal
industry over narrowing the pay differential between white- and blue-collar
workers, a number of works councils, as well as union members on the coun-
cils, had attempted to play a conciliatory role between union and management,
just as their dual mission seemed to demand. It was against this background
that the more radical unions started to press for reform and began to play with
the idea of shop steward representation and the replacement of works councils
with union plant committees. This antagonized employers and put pressure on
the government to reform the works council into a body of employee represen-
tation.
First proposals for a council without the employer were drafted in 1976,
when the Labour party was still the major party in a center-left coalition gov-
ernment. Council reform was one of the initiatives meant to attract support for
the government's policy of wage restraint (Flanagan, Soskice, and Ulman
1983). However, the proposals encountered heavy resistance from the right
while not arousing much enthusiasm from the union left. Employers' organiza-
tions and a lobby of major multinational firms warned the government not to92 Jelle Visser
proceed with its plan to create an independent works council. In 1977 the gov-
ernment fell, a new center-right coalition government was formed, and after
no more than two years Parliament voted the 1979 reform into law.
4.3.3 Representative Councils
The 1979 reform was a compromise between those who wanted to keep the
employer in the council, though not necessarily as its chairman, and those who
envisaged the works council as an instrument subject to worker control. The
first position was defended by the employers' federations, major multinational
firms, and the Christian Federation of Trade Unions (Christelijke Nationaal
Vakverbond [CNV]). The CNV and employers disagreed, however, on enlarg-
ing the council's co-determination rights and on parity representation on the
board of supervisors. The largest union federation, the Federation of Dutch
Trade Unions (Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging [FNV]), and in particular
its affiliate in the chemical, metal, and textile industries, the IB FNV, wanted
stronger worker rights, though not necessarily through the statutory works
council, which was sometimes portrayed as a competitor to the union. Employ-
ers remained set against the reform until the last minute, predicting a radical-
ization and polarization of Dutch industrial relations.
From the point of view of its intended effects the 1979 reform was a success.
Research based on surveys, case studies, and interviews is univocal in showing
that the works councils have become an established institution, that council-
employer relations have become more professional, and that there was no po-
larization of interests, or much less than had been expected (Teulings 1981,
1985; van Vuuren and Koopman 1986; Looise and Heijink 1986; Looise and
de Lange 1987; Pool et al. 1988; Pool, Koopman, and Mijs 1991). In short,
fears that the independent council would radicalize Dutch labor relations at the
workplace proved unwarranted. Today, many employers see the works council
as a necessary and in some cases useful platform without which the restructur-
ing of work organization—the major issue of the 1980s—would probably have
been less easy. With few exceptions and some reservations management has
discovered that it can live with the current law (Interviews with managers from
major multinational firms and with staff at the Ministry of Social Affairs and
Employment).
Of the main multinational firms in the Netherlands (Shell, Unilever, AKZO,
and DSM Chemicals), Philips is clearly the most unhappy with current legisla-
tion. In a report in 1988 its director of industrial relations complained that
works council members lacked expertise, indulged in unnecessary procedures,
and were insufficiently representative. They also attracted unwelcome and neg-
ative press attention, and too much time and energy was wasted on meetings.
Philips has never hidden its preference for a return to the situation before 1979
or even 1971, when the council was mainly a tool of management. Works coun-
cil members at Philips, on the other hand, complain that local works councils
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information on strategic decisions. According to union representatives, this
problem is also felt in other large multiplant companies, especially in subsidi-
aries of foreign firms. It must be added that unions at Philips are weak and
represent only between 15 and 20 percent of the employees. Management pre-
fers to deal with full-time union officials, does not want an internal role for the
union, and strongly resists a unionized works council.
4.3.4 As Works Councils Mature
It is safe to say that the position of the works council has strengthened with
regard to agenda setting, information rights, use of independent expertise, and
legal redress in conflict. It is interesting in this respect to compare the results
of two representative surveys, one conducted two years after the 1971 act (Hov-
els and Nas 1976) and the other six years after the 1979 reform (Heijink and
Looise 1986; Looise and de Lange 1987). The 1973 survey showed the em-
ployer in full control. As chairman of the council he determined its agenda,
often refusing to discuss issues prepared by the elected members. The latter
depended almost exclusively on information released by the employer during
the meeting. In 1985, by comparison, it was found that in just 1 percent of the
cases the agenda of consultation meetings was unilaterally set by the employer,
in 19 percent by the works council without apparent employer influence, and
in 80 percent by a bilateral committee or in informal meetings between the
president of the council and the director designated to represent the firm.
Changes in the type of issues handled by councils are another indicator of
the increased importance of works councils after 1979. In 1973 less than half
of the councils assigned importance to financial information or issues related
to the firm's internal organization (sec. 25 subjects on which consultation with
the council is now required). In 1985, 90 percent of the councils attached im-
portance to such issues. This does not mean that council members are satisfied
with their influence in these matters. Nearly half the works councils indicated
that information on economic, financial, and technical issues is obtained only
after management has made its decision. Late involvement and insufficient in-
formation is also reported for social and personnel issues; here one out of every
four councils complain about management's failure to provide sufficient infor-
mation.
Teulings (1985) has emphasized that the reform of 1979 has professional-
ized the works councils and promoted the development of a small "works
council industry" with its own journals, information and training services, ex-
perts, and organizational consultants. The supply of resources outside the firm,
partly maintained through public intervention, has reduced the councils' de-
pendence on management. This may well be related to the declining propensity
of councils to employ "radical" methods of action, as reported by Teulings
(1989). Fewer councils apply "unionist" power instruments, like demonstra-
tions during lunchtime, sit-ins, work-to-rule, or work stoppages. Instead, more
councils tend to use "milder," "internal" forms of protests, for instance, appeal94 Jelle Visser
to an "authoritative" third party, such as an industry board, a court, or a public
official, rather than mobilizing workers. Councils also voice protests in a staff
paper, rather than in a newspaper.
This deradicalization may reflect several developments: the onslaught of the
economic recession in the early 1980s, the weakening of unions, fatigue
among council members and workers, but also a process of learning and more
skillful use of bargaining sanctions by the stronger and previously more mili-
tant councils. The latter explanation appears to be favored by Teulings (1989,
94) who interprets the instrumental rather than expressive use of sanctions as
a sign of the advancement of a "fairly rational, calculative approach" among
leading works councils. Once established, these councils tend to prefer bar-
gaining over recourse to third parties, whereas for councils still fighting for
recognition and attention, appeal to outside support, through the law or via
extralegal action, remains important. This view is consistent with the finding
that in recent years a growing number of works councils have negotiated a
"covenant," which regulates individual employment contracts. According to
Van der Heijden (1991) this can be taken as an indicator of the maturation of
the works councils, with the latter emerging as players in their own right.
Comparing the results of their 1985 survey with the Industrial Democracy
in Europe (IDE) study of 1976 (IDE 1981; Andriessen et al. 1984), Looise and
de Lange (1987, 268) conclude that "the level of influence of the works coun-
cils has increased in all areas of decision making." But they also note the exis-
tence of a "participation paradox": involvement in decision making is strongest
toward the end of the decision-making process, in the implementation stage,
when the probability of impact on the outcome is smallest. This had also been
one of the main findings in 1976. Ten years later a majority of managers and
council presidents agree that the council is only involved in the last stages of
decision making. Ten to 20 percent agreed that the council is involved in all
stages, and about the same number responded that the council is not involved
in any part of the decision-making process at all.
It is generally acknowledged that late council involvement diminishes the
chance for councils to influence decisions, as well as for beneficial outcomes
such as job security, legitimacy for the decision itself, speedy implementation,
and employee satisfaction. Late involvement is also associated with longer
waiting times for the council to present its advice or approval (Looise and de
Lange 1987; van Vuuren and Koopman 1986; Heller et al. 1988). However, in
a replication of their 1976 study a decade later, the IDE researchers also found
that the role of the works council in strategic decisions, especially in firm or
plant restructuring, had increased. Does this indicate that the participation par-
adox is receding?
4.4 A New Logic of Exchange
The first half of the 1980s were difficult years. Plants closed, unemployment
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ered, and eligibility rules tightened (Visser 1990). A conservative political and
cultural climate emphasized the virtues of a "no-nonsense" management of
cost efficiency, competitiveness, and rewards for efforts. Organizational
change seemed driven by its own logic, fueled by market forces, international
competition, and technological innovation. In the light of these developments,
it may seem surprising that works councils increased their influence over some
aspects of management behavior. How do we explain this "growth against the
tide" (Looise 1989)?
4.4.1 The Weight of Formal Institutions
Law matters. Contrary to their initial hypothesis that the current economic,
political, and technological climate would diminish the role of works councils,
the IDE researchers found that in the mid-1980s the "relative weight of the
formal institutions had increased" (Pool et al. 1988, 54). This was best visible
in the area of strategic decision making, and more true for metal engineering
than for the service sector, such as hospitals and insurance (Pool et al. 1991).
Apparently, the strengthening of consultation rights under section 25 had made
management seek to involve the council earlier, especially where the council
could delay the implementation of decisions. This is most clearly the case with
firm and plant restructuring, followed by work planning and the arrangement
of working hours—which must be negotiated under section 27, with the coun-
cil having something close to a veto right. More than half of management re-
quests for advice were related to organizational adjustments and layoffs. Two
out of five requests for council approval were related to changes in working
hours, following a major central agreement between unions and employers in
late 1982 (Visser 1989).
Some works councils succeed in using their stronger position on operational
decisions in the human resources area as leverage to gain access to earlier
and more strategic stages of management decision making. The main sanction
against noncooperative employers is to cause delay, for instance, by lodging a
court appeal. Teulings has compared the ability of councils to delay the labor
process of management with the unions' ability to interrupt the labor process
of workers. Councils may trade their consent to speedy implementation of op-
erational decisions for earlier information and some degree of influence on
strategic decisions.
This logic of exchange, based on "conflictual cooperation," is present in only
a minority of councils. In less than 10 percent of all cases, management and
works council representatives agree that the council plays a significant role in
strategic decisions. Table 4.3 shows that only a minority of councils lodge a
formal protest if management fails to consult the council; most limit them-
selves to symbolic protest. Teulings (1989) reports a similar finding in his sur-
vey of 63 works councils in 1986. Two-thirds of the councils had never put
forward an initiative, and less than 20 percent claimed to have obtained full
information. Councils are more inclined to insist on their information rights
on social and personnel than on economic and financial issues, just as manage-96 Jelle Visser
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ment is more forthcoming with information on the former than on the latter
kinds of subjects. Clearly, the tougher sanctions under section 27 elicit more
caution and cooperation from management.
The council's ability to delay the labor process of management in restructur-
ing contrasts with its much weaker position on new technology. To begin with,
section 25 does not mention technology and automation as an issue on which
consultation and information is mandatory. Moreover, the link between techno-
logical choice and the redesign of work organization is often vague and may
be traceable only ex post facto. The IDE researchers observe that in technology
decisions the legal position of the council is ambiguous, that expertise is often
lacking, and that management is reluctant to involve the council in this kind of
strategic choice (Pool et al. 1988). Indeed, explicit reference to automation and
technology in section 25 is one of the proposals for legal reform that have been
considered by the Social Economic Council in the past two years. Divisions
between employers and unions have prevented a unanimous opinion, and new
legislation is therefore unlikely. The weaker position of the council on techno-
logical and major financial decisions is also reflected in worker opinion. Work-
ers assign more influence to works councils on issues like "job security" and
"fair treatment" than on "automation" or "financial decisions" and are also
much more positive about the council's contribution in the first two cases (van
de Putte et al. 1991).
4.4.2 The Council's Role in Reorganization: Some Examples
Some of the councils that have advanced into strategic decision making are
found at major manufacturing firms, for instance, at NedCar, a joint venture of
Volvo and Mitsubishi, at Daf Trucks, and at Hoogovens, a steel manufacturer.
These firms underwent major organizational changes in the 1980s. At NedCar
the works council was able to trade its agreement to a new kanban organization
for early information on strategic business plans and the appointment of a
"trusted member" to the firm's board of supervisors. In the recent case of the
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the central works council played a prominent role at all stages of the negotia-
tion process and succeeded in obtaining guarantees for airplane production and
employment remaining in Holland. It is significant that management informed
the central works council the day after Fokker and Dasa had signed their "oper-
ational agreement," before the minister of economic affairs, who is the main
shareholder of Fokker, and before the unions. Three days later the council pre-
sented management with its counterproposals. In the three weeks that followed
before the definite takeover decision, the council closely cooperated with the
unions and the chairman of the parliamentary committee for economic affairs.
The council met twice with the minister and strengthened his hand in the nego-
tiations (Niewe Rotterdamse Courant-Handelsblad, September 4, 1992; Inter-
views).
How many councils exploit their opportunities for bargaining in this way is
not known. The Fokker case is probably exceptional and reflects the technolog-
ical, political, and symbolic importance of the country's only airplane manu-
facturer. The downsizing of another industrial champion, Hoogovens, has at-
tracted similar attention. In September 1992, the firm proposed to lay off 2,500
workers, including for the first time since 1945 involuntary dismissals. While
accepting the need for further cost cutting and downsizing, unavoidable in the
face of cheap imports from Eastern Europe and the European Community's
ban on public subsidies, the unions and the central works council were quick
to reject the proposal and vetoed any forced dismissals. The next step will be
a compromise with further cost-cutting reorganization, an extensive social plan
cushioning layoffs, and no or very few forced separations.
In this context, developments at Philips should also be mentioned. As part
of its "Operation Centaur," intended to refocus the firm on its core activities
and develop a leaner and more market-driven organization, Philips has in re-
cent years reduced its workforce in the Netherlands from 70,000 to 45,000,
partly by selling some divisions and business units and partly by restructuring
and layoffs. Within the constraints of the law, management has worked mainly
with the unions and kept the central and local works councils at bay. An im-
portant factor is that the company has always been able to avoid forced dismiss-
als. For access to an unorganized and intimidated workforce, management has
increased its use of "direct communication," with televised speeches by the
director-general and feedback discussion groups.
A case with interesting implications, especially for the application of Dutch
law to foreign-based multinational firms, is the closure of the Amsterdam plant
of the British-American Tobacco Corporation. Batco Amsterdam is a small and
very modern facility with between 200 and 300 employees, profitable, with an
active works council and a comparatively high level of union organization. In
the late 1970s Batco International, based in London, decided to close the plant
in Amsterdam and relocate production to its plant in Brussels. After an appeal
lodged by the trade unions, the Company Law Chamber, in a rare "audit proce-
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of failing to consult properly with the unions and the works councils, manage-
ment had not given sufficient weight to social as compared to economic inter-
ests. The verdict sent a shock through the Dutch business community; some
argued that the judges had placed themselves in the chair of the entrepreneur.
Batco rescinded its decision and even built a new, though smaller, production
facility in Amsterdam.
In 1989, however, Batco International decided for a second time that the
Amsterdam plant must be closed and work relocated to Brussels. Council and
unions were doing everything possible to keep the plant open. Failing other
efforts, the council lodged another appeal with the Company Law Chamber
arguing that, according to expert opinion, there were no sound economic rea-
sons for the decision and that consultation had been insufficient. This time,
however, the court let management have its way, stating that consultations had
taken place and that in the final analysis it was not the council but management
that is responsible for weighing social against business interests. According to
legal experts, the new verdict indicated not only that Batco had learned how to
discharge its obligation to consult but also a shift in legal doctrine (Koning
1991). In another case, in 1985, the court had ruled that while a foreign multi-
national firm is fully entitled to direct its subsidiary, this cannot take away
rights and obligations under Dutch law. In the 1989 Batco case, however, the
court took a different view, observing that a Dutch subsidiary is bound by the
business strategies of its proprietor firm unless this constitutes an unreasonable
infringement of rights under Dutch law.
4.4.3 Variations across Firms
The 1979 reform increased the resources and the overall influence of works
councils, but its equalizing impact remains to be seen. Works councils differ
very much in their level of activity, use of legal rights, readiness to protest and
appeal employer decisions, and propensity to engage in extralegal or militant
action. A persistent finding in all surveys of the 1980s is that about one-third
of all councils make full use of their legal possibilities, meet frequently with
management, employ bargaining tactics, and do not shy away from reliance on
legal sanctions or pressure tactics if need be. An equally large proportion rarely
invoke their rights. Management failure to consult and perfunctory council dis-
cussions are a frequently observed phenomenon (Teulings 1989).
Strong councils have made better use of the possibilities of the 1979 reform
than weak councils and have increased their lead over the latter. In the early
1980s, some councils were quick to perceive and make use of the new opportu-
nities, while others behaved as if no change had occurred or made at best ritual-
istic use of their newly acquired rights (Teulings 1985). This is probably the
best explanation why the works councils grew apart, in terms of their levels
of activity and their effectiveness. Learning by imitation should increase the
equalizing effects of the law in the future.
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support from the union and, in particular, a council majority of FNV members.
Councils with an FNV majority—about one-third of all councils—made more
use of their legal and extralegal opportunities. FNV-dominated councils were
more likely to be found in manufacturing, construction, and transport than in
public or private services, more in large than in small firms, and more in estab-
lishments with production workers than in offices or white-collar environ-
ments. In the larger manufacturing firms it is not uncommon that the main
FNV union organizes a union plant committee that monitors the works council
(see section 4.5.3 below). Effectiveness was measured by the degree to which
the council evaluated its influence on management decisions as "considerable,"
enabling it to achieve a different outcome than originally proposed or intended
by management. This included the possibility of management anticipating
council opposition.
Looise and de Lange reject the claim that union organization or a particular
majority corresponds with more active use of legal rights and greater influence
on management. Like Pool et al. (1988), they stress firm size, the existence
of a personnel department, the age of the council, and its relations with its
constituency and external union officials as the main causes of differences in
council performance. The first and last of these factors correlate with the level
of unionization and the presence of a union plant committee. Unfortunately,
the number of cases are too small to estimate the impact of unions while hold-
ing some of these factors constant.
What is at stake in these debates is the dynamics of power and exchange
between management and the works council. Teulings argues that the council's
ability to delay decision making is decisive for bringing about a process of
"political bargaining" in which management trades information and consulta-
tion for cooperation with and legitimation of its decisions. The IDE researchers
argue that retreat to a legalistic position is the main management response to
radical or militant councils: information is of poor quality, and consultation
takes place only if it is enforceable under the law (Pool et al. 1988, 53); a
case in point is Philips. Looise and de Lange (1987, 268-69) also argue that
cooperative councils have a better chance of gaining access to the early and
more important stages of decision making, whereas councils that insist on for-
mal rights are confined to dealing with the implementation of decisions. As
early as the 1960s, Dutch organization sociologists argued that cooperative
councils were more effective and had more influence than conflictual councils
(Lammers 1968).
But why would management "give away power" if not under pressure? De
Man and Koopman (1984) argue that management cooperation can be ex-
plained by management's desire to increase worker commitment, as well as its
need to gain acceptance for decisions. The works council, then, serves as a
"sounding board" for preparing major strategic shifts, with communication
through the council making it unnecessary for management to reach each indi-
vidual worker through line managers. Also, communication through the coun-100 Jelle Visser
cil may inspire greater confidence among workers. For this contribution the
council may receive compensation in terms of earlier involvement in manage-
ment choice. My own view is that the cases of works councils that seem influ-
ential without ever having applied sanctions and without any trace of union
support—as observed in the software sector, at IBM, or in certain financial
institutions—are explained by high and stable profit levels, high public visibil-
ity, and resulting needs for legitimation, as well as management desire to keep
the firm union free. "Cooperation without conflict" may well end if a drop in
profitability requires a revision of the firm's employment policy.
4.5 Unions and Councils: Friends or Foes?
4.5.1 Absence of a Tradition
To understand the relationship between trade unions and the works council
in the Netherlands, we need to recall some historical facts about Dutch trade
unions. The first point is the absence of a craft tradition in a union movement
that emerged late in the nineteenth century. With few exceptions Dutch unions
originated outside the firm and were relatively centralized. The division of the
Dutch labor movement in three ideological and religious currents (socialist,
Catholic, and Calvinist), each enveloped in emergent political movements
striving for full political citizenship, promoted further centralization (Harmsen
and Reinalda 1975).
Second, unlike Germany there was no council tradition in the Netherlands.
Neither in the upheaval following the First World War, in which the Nether-
lands remained neutral, nor in the years after the Second World War was there
a council movement among workers. Nor had there been a council organization
in the 1870s when the first groups of (skilled) workers began to organize trade
unions. In 1874 a Calvinist brewer organized his employees into a "factory
council"—or "core committee" as it was then called—but few if any Dutch
employers appear to have imitated this high-minded example of what seems to
have been benevolent paternalism (van Haren 1985).
It is true that there were attempts to lure workers into employer-dominated
councils after unions had organized and became more aggressive in asking for
collective agreements. In 1907 the metalworkers union brandished the "core
committees" as "obstacles to the development of worker organizations ...
against the interests of the workers." The union warned its members "not to
take part in elections or to join such bodies" (van der Berg 1924, 58-59). The
attempts to head off the development of true union representation with pater-
nalistic works councils were, however, bound to fail. After the establishment
of collective agreements around the First World War, employer-initiated works
councils were no longer a threat to unions, and employers lost interest. Some
hundred factory councils, of little relevance, appear to have lingered on into
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4.5.2 Union Ambiguity
After 1945, Dutch unions conceded the workplace to the employer. Not that
unions had much influence in the workplace when they made this concession,
given the absence of a craft tradition. Windmuller (1969, 402) was probably
right when he wrote that "the neglect of the plant as a place of activity was
also very much the result of a sober appraisal of the power distribution between
management and labor." Moreover, the social democratic union movement in
particular held a deeply felt conviction that works councils would fuel Betrieb-
segoismus, to use the German expression, and become the springboard for
company- rather than industry-based forms of solidarity, undermining sectoral
multiemployer agreements and ultimately jeopardizing the equalizing logic of
action of the industrial union. In the first decade after the war, competition with
nonrecognized communist unions, which did particularly well in the first
works council elections in the metal and shipbuilding industries in Amsterdam
and Rotterdam, added to the sense of uneasiness (Harmsen and Reinalda 1975;
Hueting et al. 1985).
Starting in the metal industry, unions began to organize a network of plant
representatives in the late 1960s, and a decade later similar initiatives were
taken in the service sector. Originally, this overlapped with the organization of
preparatory meetings of elected council members. In the union that most ac-
tively pursued the new strategy, the Industriebond NVV (now IB FNV), the
plant committee had the task of monitoring the behavior of elected council
members and screening the union list of council candidates. This was resented
by council members and created many tensions in the union. In the course of
the 1970s the union became more radical and favored a workers' control strat-
egy, which met with hostility from employers and with skepticism by most
other unions.
In quantitative terms, the new approach seemed successful. By the end of
the decade the IB FNV reported that it had organized 574 plant committees,
compared to around 1,000 works councils in its domain. These committees
covered about half of all establishments where the union had at least 25 mem-
bers (IB FNV 1979). However, the quality of these committees was often very
poor. Only one-third or one-fourth of these committees were really active; their
protection against employer retaliation was modest as many employers refused
to grant recognition; they were highly dependent on, and often abandoned by,
union district officials; and in most cases they sought in vain for a role that was
not yet occupied by external union officials or, indeed, by the works councils
(van Vliet 1979). Also, the union was never fully committed to a workers'
control strategy and never contemplated a devolution of power over collective
bargaining or strikes, which remained firmly in the hands of union officials
supervised by the union's central office. Still, the development and radicalism
of the plant committees did contribute to the 1979 reform insofar as it rallied
conservative support in Parliament for a stronger works council as the lesser
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Soon after the reform, the unions adjusted their strategy. In 1980, the IB
FNV announced that "under the present circumstances, the works councils
seem to offer more possibilities than union action through the plant committees
or the district officials" (IB FNV 1980). Especially in the recession of the early
1980s, with its plant closures, restructurings, and layoffs, the plant committees
had a difficult time. Left alone by district officials who were fully absorbed by
negotiations over layoffs and social plans, leading members resigned or sought
refuge in the works council. With its enhanced powers, the council seemed to
have at least a legal grip on the problem, if only because it had access to infor-
mation on business plans, mergers and takeovers, reorganization, and reloca-
tion of firm activities. Not least, its members had protection against dismissal
and were entitled to basic facilities.
A bill to offer some protection and facilities to union plant representatives
was presented in 1981, but a few years later was shelved and has recently
been withdrawn. The unions never made it an important issue. Currently, most
collective agreements provide some guarantees to union representatives in the
workplace, but always less than the protection and support which council
members are assured. In the late 1980s IB FNV restated its policy that plant
committees should play a supportive role for the works council. There are even
more committees than in 1979, but still only one in four is truly active (IB
FNV 1988), and fewer still have a true role in decentralized bargaining (van
Rhijn and Huiskamp 1989).
In conclusion, partly in response to the institutional strengthening of the
works council and partly under pressure from the shift from sectoral to firm-
level decision making among employers, Dutch unions have adopted the works
council as an additional instrument for the defense of worker interests. In this
section I have highlighted the turns in the policies of the IB FNV because it is
the leading union in the field, had considerable influence on legislation, and
had to make the largest adjustment after the reform of 1979. Christian and
white-collar unions always had a more positive attitude toward the works coun-
cil, and unions outside the manufacturing industry had been slower to start
plant committees.
4.5.3 Weak and Divided Unionism
Between 1945 and 1975 the overall level of unionization in the Netherlands
averaged a stable 40 percent of all wage and salary earners. In the 1980s aggre-
gate union density dropped by more than 10 percentage points—from about
37 percent in 1979 to 25 percent in 1989—partly reflecting a wider definition
of employment, including part-time jobs held mainly by women. The decline
signifies a substantial weakening of the union presence in nearly all occupa-
tions and industries. Private sector density is currently down to about 18 per-
cent; even in manufacturing only one in four workers is member of a union,
and in financial and commercial services fewer than one in ten. Within Western
Europe, the Netherlands now has one of the lowest union density rates, after
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The union decline has multiple causes. Unemployment reached double dig-
its in the first half of the 1980s; employment in manufacturing and construction
and among blue-collar workers contracted sharply. Between 1982 and 1986
unions had to accept a substantial loss in real wages. Social security benefits
were cut. When the center-right government pulled away from customary in-
comes policies and employers shifted their attention to the firm, the highly
centralized Dutch unions were left to their own devices and suffered (Visser
1990). Generally well staffed, though mainly specialized in participation in
macroeconomic and social security policy networks at the national level, the
main federations and private sector unions have been forced to lay off staff and
restructure their internal organizations. Traditionally, unions have been poor in
servicing members in firms.
The power of Dutch unions is further impaired by ideological divisions. His-
torically, Dutch unions were divided into a social democratic, a Catholic, and
a Protestant union movement, with a syndicalist (later communist) and a liberal
fringe. After 1945, in spite of the failure to reunify the union movement, there
was a high degree of interunion cooperation. In the 1970s a new attempt to
unify all currents failed and led to increased tensions between the FNV, which
combined the social democratic and Catholic unions, and the remaining Prot-
estant center, the CNV, which attracted the membership of a number of Catho-
lic public sector unions. A third federation, MHP, was formed in 1974 of white-
collar unions and staff associations. FNV and CNV unions organize on an
industry basis, often combining several industries in one union in order to ob-
tain economies of scale. FNV unions represent about 60 percent of all union
members, CNV unions some 20 percent. In the Netherlands there exists no
doctrine of "exclusive jurisdiction." Unions that are affiliated to the FNV, the
CNV, or the MHP are automatically granted recognition at the industry or firm
level, irrespective of actual membership. Of course, membership levels and
union strike capacity do carry weight in bargaining with employers.
The consequences of union pluralism are several: interunion competition,
especially over objectives and policies (member poaching is rare), diminished
bargaining power and fragile strike coalitions, competition over works council
representation, and attention to the needs of the marginal rather than the me-
dian worker. In the context of this paper it should be stressed that multiunion-
ism makes it unlikely that works councils, even where they are highly union-
ized, will become the extended arm of a union.
4.5.4 Social Profile and Unionization of Works Councils
The social profile of works councils members in the Netherlands is tradi-
tional: male (83 percent), standard employment contract, full-time job, long
job tenure (15 years on average), and skilled (49 percent, compared with 18
percent unskilled or semiskilled, and 33 percent supervisory and technical
staff). The comparative figures for the labor force are 67 percent male, 5 to 10
percent in flexible employment, 20 to 30 percent in part-time jobs (of which
80 percent are held by women), 8 to 10 years of job tenure, 40 percent un-104 Jelle Visser
skilled and semiskilled, 40 percent skilled, and 20 percent supervisory and
technical staff. As can be expected, works council members are also on average
older and have more years of general education or vocational training. The
social profile of union membership lies somewhere between that of council
members and of the workforce as a whole.
61 do not know of data on the repre-
sentation of ethnic minorities and immigrant workers.
In contrast with the sharp decline in union density in the 1980s, the unions
maintained their position on the works councils (table 4.4). Two-thirds of all
works council seats are occupied by union members. FNV members outnum-
ber CNV members by a stable ratio of 3.5 to 1, which corresponds to their
relative strength in private sector membership. The unionization rate of works
council members, at 64 percent, exceeds that of employees in the private sec-
tor—18 percent—by a large margin. The most appropriate comparison, of
course, is with the employees eligible to vote in works council elections in
hundred-plus firms. In our 1991 survey, we measured a union density rate of
39 percent of employees in such establishments (van de Putte et al. 1991).
Among eligible workers, turnout is higher among union members. In our
recent survey of FNV and CNV members, 72 percent indicated that they voted
"always," 11 percent "usually," 3 percent "occasionally," and 14 percent
"never." Eighty-six percent said they had voted in the last election (Klander-
mans et al. 1992). The fact remains that a large number of nonmembers vote
for union candidates, and an even larger proportion would do so if given a
chance. In many firms, the absence of a sufficient number of union members
prevents the presentation of a union list. Even among union members, 25 per-
cent indicated that there had been no union list in their firm, and 16 percent
said they could not tell since they had given their vote to personally known
candidates irrespective of union membership (van de Putte et al. 1991).
One of every four councils experiences difficulties with finding candidates,
and another 37 percent report problems, although less than 3 percent of seats
remain vacant. Problems are most severe where unions are absent or scarcely
visible, that is, in smaller establishments and firms, and in firms in commercial
and financial services (Looise and de Lange 1987; Huiskamp and Risseeuw
1988). The problems include negative impact on prospects of promotion in the
firm, lack of cooperation from the employer, and excessive demands on one's
leisure time (Acampo, Kunst, and Soeters 1987). In a survey of council mem-
bers commissioned by the CNV, 24 percent of members that had ended their
council activities mentioned that membership had held up their career. But it
was also found that council members tend to be longer with the firm and to
have already exhausted their possibilities of internal promotion (CNV 1986).
Can we interpret the support for union candidates in works council elections
as a vote of confidence for the unions, despite the declined propensity of work-
6. CBS, Enquete beroepsbevolking (Quarterly Labor Force Sample Survey) (The Hague, 1986);
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Table 4.4 Union Density



















































Sources: J. Visser, DUES database; calculated from Teulings (1981) and Looise and de Lange
(1987); Visser (1991b).
ers to become members? Does the disparity indicate a free rider problem, in
that voting for a union-backed council member, presumably making the coun-
cil more effective while not making the voter share in the costs of union organi-
zation, is a rational response of calculating employees? In our survey we asked
whether respondents thought that the works council made the union redundant
and whether voting for a union list is a substitute for membership. An over-
whelming majority rejects the first statement; less than one in ten respondents
agreed strongly. Those that felt it was enough to vote for a union list were more
numerous, 30 percent; but 55 percent disagreed with this proposition, and 14
percent were not sure. In short, some crowding-out does seem to occur. The
real problem, however, is that Dutch unions, given their internal divisions and
their long absence from the workplace, find it hard to activate mechanisms of
social punishment for free riders privatizing public goods. The comparison
with Belgium, where works councils were introduced later and have remained
secondary to recognized union shop representatives (Visser 1991a), and Ger-
many, where DGB unions hold a virtual monopoly of representation, is in-
structive.
4.5.5 Union Politics on Works Councils
On about one-third of the councils the FNV has a majority. This has not
changed much during the membership crisis of the 1980s (table 4.5). On the
basis of their survey, Huiskamp and Risseeuw (1988) found similar proportions
in 1988. On about 25 percent of the works councils no FNV member is present,
while on just under 20 percent there are neither FNV nor CNV representatives.
An FNV majority is more likely in manufacturing, construction, and transport.
In commercial services more than half of the works councils have a nonunion
majority.
Surprisingly, the proportion of works councils with a nonunion majority has
declined between 1980 and 1985, from 34 to 25 percent, in contrast to the
trends in union membership. This probably reflects the lesser "staying power"
of unorganized council members. Council members without the support of a



































Sources: Calculated from Teulings (1981) and Looise and de Lange (1987).
to run a second time. A survey among former council members in 1986, com-
missioned by the CNV, indicated that almost one in four council members did
not complete their terms.
Table 4.5 (cols. [3] and [4]) also shows that the likelihood of a union major-
ity, and an FNV majority in particular, increases on central works councils.
This is the result of indirect elections with lower-level councils each choosing
one delegate, who is likely to come from the largest group or the group that is
most effective in coalition building. The 1980 works council election at Philips
can serve as an illustration. On the 91 councils at the establishment level the
FNV union gained 33 percent of the seats, in the 20 divisional councils its
share rose to 40 percent, and on the central works council it achieved a major-
ity of 52 percent. Unions representing managerial and technical staff are also
overrepresented on central works councils; within the FNV, the skilled manual
and white-collar component increases with council level. The reverse is true
for women. Fifteen percent of the elected members of establishment works
councils were women, and there were still 33 women among the 330 divisional
council members; none, however, was left on the central works council. Non-
union members occupied 44 percent of the seats on establishment councils,
but only 11 percent on the central works council. This goes some way toward
explaining the preference of management for direct election of the central
works council.
Regular contact with its voters and with the external union contributes to the
council's level of activity. Again, a picture of great variation emerges. About
40 percent of the councils organize regular meetings with their electorate or
have office hours during which council members can be consulted. Another 40
percent limit themselves to providing information, through a staff paper or a
bulletin or billboard, and 20 percent do not have any contact, active or passive,
with their voters. Most works councils (79 percent) report "contact with the
union," but the majority of these contacts are ad hoc. Forty-three percent report
the existence of a union plant committee, but only 24 percent of the councils
have regular contact with it (Looise and de Lange 1987). The presence of a
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creases with the size of the establishment. Union plant committees exist in 60
percent of the largest firms (more than 1,000 employees); in manufacturing
this proportion rises to 90 percent. The proportion of firms with a union plant
committee is 50 percent among medium-sized firms (400 to 1,000 employees)
and decreases to 28 percent in firms with fewer than 400 employees (van Rhijn
and Huiskamp 1989).
Works councils with an organized constituency and structured contacts with
the external union pursue and guard their rights more vigorously. This does not
imply that they are more adversarial or reject a larger proportion of manage-
ment proposals. They may rather be better prepared and behave in a prudent
and calculating way, especially when they have regular contacts with union
officials; or indeed management may behave differently toward them and in-
volve them on a more regular basis. This would sustain the conclusion that
works councils do not substitute for trade unions. If well organized, with good
full-time staff and effective internal organization, unions can help create effec-
tive works councils. As a result, works councils may be rather ineffective when
unions are ineffective, although in many firms this is yet to be tested.
4.5.6 Works Councils and Collective Bargaining
In the 1980s virtually all Dutch businesses restructured their activities, often
making accompanying heavy cutbacks in staff. The first motive was to restore
cost efficiency and profitability; later, general demands for working-time re-
duction required new ways of organizing work teams and time schedules. In
addition came new ideas about leaner organization and human resource man-
agement: flatter hierarchies, reintegration of staff and line functions, mar-
ketlike transactions between organizational units, employee involvement, and
productivity- and quality-related reward structures. From being championed
for its own sake, worker participation became a means to improve productivity
and product quality; in the words of a leading Dutch sociologist of organiza-
tion, participation is now promoted for functional rather than structural reasons
(Lammers 1974).
It is not yet possible to estimate the full impact of these changes, but un-
doubtedly the importance of the firm as an arena in labor relations has in-
creased. Sectoral multiemployer agreements on wages, hours, and related con-
ditions remain important in metal engineering, construction, printing, the dairy
industry, agriculture, banking, insurance, and hospitals and health care institu-
tions, to name only the most important. But there is also a tendency to make
application of these agreements more flexible and allow better tailoring to the
conditions in individual firms. Company agreements have always been pre-
dominant in the international sector of the Dutch economy (Philips, Shell, Uni-
lever, AKZO, DSM, PTT, and KLM) and are also typical for firms in the rap-
idly expanding sector of professional and business services, though many of
these firms offer only individual contracts.
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shops, is rare. Industrywide agreements tend to set minimum rather than stan-
dard terms, but the differences are often small. Unions, in particular affiliates
of the FNV, seem attracted to a "second round" in the negotiating process, after
framework agreements have been reached at the industry level; but the leading
employers' federation in the metal and electronics industry has rejected this
since two bargaining rounds would, in its words, inevitably lead to two pay
rounds. The General Employers' Association (AWV), which is not itself in-
volved in bargaining and instead assists individual firms, is more disposed to
a two-tier bargaining system. Both the sectoral and the general employers' as-
sociations agree that industry-level agreements have still a function to serve,
but they want leaner agreements with narrower coverage and scope, allowing
for more individual contracts and reversing the trend toward adding ever newer
subjects such as pay compensation systems, training, health, job security, facil-
ities, and so forth.
The unions are reluctant to accept a larger role for the works councils in
decentralized collective bargaining. They favor a more restrictive reading of
section 27.3 of the Works Council Act—which prohibits the council from re-
negotiating matters already dealt with by collective agreement—to the effect
that councils should be allowed to renegotiate matters under agreement only if
asked to do so by the contracting parties. In 1990 the Foundation of Labor, in
which the central employers' and union organizations work together, surpris-
ingly issued a recommendation to revise the law in this direction. Employers
saw a chance to restrict the scope of co-determination, whereas the unions
wanted to forestall an erosion of their prerogatives. This manifestation of op-
portunism led to protests among works council members and the union rank
and file, and the proposal has not been heard of since. After almost two years,
the Social Economic Council, whose advice on works council reform was in-
vited by the government, still does not know what to do and is hopelessly
divided. A change of the law in either direction—reducing or expanding the
bargaining responsibilities of works councils—is improbable.
Dutch employers seem not quite ready to concede works councils a greater
bargaining role. In 1985 the parliamentary leader of the Christian Democratic
party, who was later minister of social affairs and employment (1990-94), pro-
posed increasing the role of the council in decentralized wage bargaining,
causing a storm of protest from the unions, especially from the FNV. But em-
ployers did not embrace the idea either. The general position of their associa-
tions, and the actual behavior of most employers, is to keep works councils out
of wage bargaining. According to a representative sample among Dutch firms
by Huiskamp and Risseeuw (1988), only 6 percent of all works councils were
actually involved in collective bargaining. It must be recalled that, unlike trade
unions, works councils cannot legally call a strike.
The role of the works council is different in firms not covered by an industry
or company collective agreement. This is often the case in the subsidiaries of
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and consultancy and accountancy firms, and also at Dow Chemicals. Not all
American firms stay outside the employers' federations, however, and collec-
tive agreements may also be absent in Dutch-owned firms. In these cases man-
agement sometimes negotiates a "covenant" with the council. In a recent court
case
7 the unions demanded nullification of such a covenant signed between the
works council and an employer who had refused to negotiate with the unions.
The court rejected this request, arguing that under Dutch law unions do not
hold the exclusive right of employee representation in collective bargaining.
While works councils cannot renegotiate a collective agreement signed by
unions, where the emperor is not present he loses his rights. If unions fail to
organize or gain a collective contract because the employer refuses recogni-
tion, works councils are free to negotiate alternative arrangements. Covenants
lack the juridical infrastructure of the collective agreement, do not receive pub-
lic protection, and are not legally binding on individual contracts between em-
ployer and employee (Doup and Van der Heijden 1991).
The long-term implications of this ruling remain to be seen. Elsewhere I
have argued that in Dutch industrial relations the traditional, highly central-
ized, and patterned model of industrial relations is being eroded by strong cen-
trifugal pressures (Visser 1992b). The 1980s witnessed the emergence of a
terra nova of large and small firms connected to volatile international markets
and engaging in innovative work organization and labor management prac-
tices. Many new and expanding firms in emerging sectors, such as business
services, computers and information processing, and small-scale engineering
and design, are nonunion. If management discovers that individual contracting
is less than optimal, especially in such areas as training, job evaluation, and
company benefits, its natural partner is the (nonunion) works council. It would
be premature to argue that in this case the council becomes a union substitute,
since there was no union to begin with. The question is rather whether councils
in this case preempt union organization and make the organizing task of unions
more difficult. I have no direct evidence either way, but one might speculate
that the road to union organization may well go via works councils. As a next
step, employees, if they feel they need stronger negotiators, may vote for candi-
dates who have the support of unions.
4.6 Evaluation: Costs and Benefits of Works Councils
What do works councils contribute to the economy, the performance of
firms, and the welfare of workers? What costs in terms of time, money, produc-
tion losses, or otherwise are associated with works councils, and who is paying
them? Do councils benefit only insiders? Do they lower employment levels
by raising the threshold for employment? Do councils help management and
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employees negotiate more efficiently and accelerate adjustment to changing
technological and international conditions?
The data needed for drawing a complete social, political, cultural, and eco-
nomic balance sheet of the works council is lacking. Recently, van Hees (1993)
explored the impact of works councils and unions on labor costs, quality and
speed of decision making, conflict resolution and social peace, management
quality, wage inequality, and the use of external resources in Dutch firms. How-
ever, his was a qualitative study based on a discussion of one case in particular,
and he made no distinction between the impact of the union and that of the
works council. To my knowledge there exist no empirical studies on the effect
of Dutch works councils on firm profitability or productivity, over time or
across firms. Generalization from case studies is not without problems: all sur-
veys show that council practices vary a great deal, although the legal structure
of constraints and opportunities is the same. On the other hand, while manag-
ers and works council presidents disagree on many aspects of council perfor-
mance, on one point they agree: works councils have improved the quality of
decision making, and works council legislation has penalized hit-and-run
styles of management.
Of course this comes at a cost: decisions take longer and require more prepa-
ration, paperwork, and meetings, and this is often perceived as an increase in
rigidity. Other costs include time off and training for council members, as well
as expert advice and other resources that must be paid for by the employer. For
a firm of 500 employees, I hazard an estimated cost of 2 percent of the annual
wage bill, taking into account paid leave, meetings, facilities, and the council's
budget. This does not include the hours management spends on consultation
and preparation. The benefit for the firm is greater legitimacy and better accep-
tance of painful decisions, especially on organizational adjustments. Time
"wasted" on preparation may be time saved on implementation, more efficient
bargaining, and less conflict. But the largest benefit may well be higher worker
commitment, which may survive even painful adjustment processes.
The benefits for workers are more security and fairness, with few or no costs
attached. With some sense of fairness in decision making and increased em-
ployment security, the acceptability of decisions will rise. Works councils, if
they actively use the opportunities offered by the law, will ensure that due
consideration will be given to the social and employment consequences of de-
cisions, and that forced dismissals or layoffs will be used only as a last resort.
If there must be forced separations, the firm must come forward with a social
compensation plan, which usually offers better terms than existing social secu-
rity and unemployment insurance provisions. Because of the high costs in-
volved, employers will have an incentive to think of something better than re-
turning redundant workers to the external labor market. In exchange,
employees will have less reason to oppose alternative options which may entail
changes in tasks, job loads, skills, or working hours for themselves.
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crowding-out of unions by works councils. Under multiunionism it is difficult
for unions to conquer the workplace through control of the council. We have
shown some evidence that workers do perceive voting for union candidates as
a substitute for union membership. However, few workers see the works coun-
cil as a substitute for the union, and most workers believe that both institutions
are needed to be effective. This suggests that Dutch unions suffer from a free
rider problem that they cannot solve without either improving their services to
members or reinforcing social norms of solidarity through plant organizations
of their own.
On the other hand, voting may be a first step toward greater involvement in
the union, and unions may find it easier to organize councils than disaggre-
gated workers. There are no indications that employers use councils against
unions. Most firms prefer to bargain with unions rather than with works coun-
cils. But there are also firms that have excluded unions, insist on non-union
membership as a condition of employment, offer individual employment con-
tracts only, and entertain a rather cozy relationship with the council. At the
same time, we also witness a formalization of relations in these very firms,
through quasi-collective agreements ("covenants") which may well prove an
intermediate step from individual contracting to full-blown collective bar-
gaining.
We may, finally, look at the costs and benefits of works councils from a
societal point of view. I have found no evidence that works council legislation
has scared away businesses or lowered investment and employment in the
Netherlands. Less conflict, higher worker commitment, and more investment
in training may be seen as advantages. Statutory works councils cast the safety
net for workers wider than unions, though they need the help of unions under
adverse conditions. Works councils also assist in the enforcement of health and
safety legislation, the protection of handicapped and disabled persons, equal
opportunity, and so forth, where the law explicitly assigns a monitoring task to
them. Councils may well deepen the bite of legislation on firms, but as local
enforcement agents, trained in weighing conflicting interests, they may also
help find customized and flexible solutions.
My overall conclusion is that, even under weak and divided unionism as
currently exists in the Netherlands, works councils do make a positive differ-
ence. Despite the economic recession and severe union decline, councils have
achieved an established position in Dutch industrial relations. They contribute
to the quality of managerial decision making and help trade flexibility in work
organization for employment security. This beneficial outcome is not always
achieved, and in fact much variation is found in what works councils actually
do. Some are sleeping and have never been tested, and others would fail if they
were, but some—probably a minority—have become active players. Where
councils have achieved an active role, this was often because of support from
an organized constituency and the union; but there are also examples of works
councils that owe their position to employers realizing a functional need for112 Jelle Visser
consultation. Above all, works councils, having been strengthened as an insti-
tution of employee representation in 1979, have cushioned the impact of eco-
nomic adversity and union decline on firm-level labor relations in the Nether-
lands during the 1980s.
References
Acampo, J., P. Kunst, and J. Soeters. 1987. OR-lidmaatschap en loopbaanperspectief.
Tijdschrift voor Arbeidsvraagstukken 3(4): 37-49.
Andriessen, Jan H. T. H., Pieter J. D. Drenth, and C. J. Lammers. 1984. Medezeg-
genschap in Nederlandse bedrijven: Verslag van een onderzoek naarparticipatie- en
invloedsverhoudingen. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Buitendam, Arend-Jan. 1979. Personeelsafdelingen in de Industrie. Groningen: Kons-
tapel.
CNV (Christelijk Nationaal Vakverbond). 1987. OR-lidmaatschap, loopbaan en ver-
loop. Report prepared by Rijksuniversiteit Limburg. Utrecht: Christelijk Nationaal
Vakbverbond. Mimeograph.
Dekkers, H., P. T. Calhoen, and J. H. T. H. Andriessen. 1989. Medezeggenschap in
kleine ondernemingen (35-100 werknemers). Tilburg: Instituut voor Sociaal-
Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek.
de Man, Herman, and Paul L. Koopman. Medezeggenschap tussen ideologie en bedrijf-
spraktijk. M&O: Tijdschrift voor organisatiekunde en sociaal beleid 38(6): 471-80.
Doup, Anneke C. B. W., and Paul F. Van der Heijden. 1991. Medezeggeschap per con-
venant. The Hague: Organisatie voor Strategisch Arbeidsmarktonderzoek.
Drenth, Pieter J. D., and J. C. van der Pijl. 1966. De Ondernemingsraad in Nederland.
The Hague: Sociaal Economische Raad.
EIM (Economisch Instituut voor het Midden- en Kleinbedrijf). 1990. The state of small
business in the Netherlands, rev. ed. Zoetermeer: Economisch Instituut voor het
Midden- en Kleinbedrijf.
Fase, Wim J. P. M. 1969. Medezeggenschap in de onderneming. Haarlem: Algemene
Werkgevers vereniging.
Flanagan, Robert J., David W. Soskice, and Lloyd Ulman. 1983. Unionism, economic
stabilization and incomes policies: European experience. Washington D.C.: Brook-
ings Institution.
Harmsen, Ger, and Bob Reinalda. 1975. Voor de bevrijding van de arbeid: Beknopte
geschiedenis van de Nederlandse arbeidsbeweging. Nijmegen: Socialistiese Uitgev-
erij Nijmegen.
Heijink, Jan Z. 1986. Het functioneren van de ondernemingsraad. Namens: Tijdschrift
voor vertegenwoordiging en bestuur 2: 56-57.
Heller, Frank A., Pieter J. D. Drenth, Paul L. Koopman, and Vaklo Rus. 1988. Decisions
in organizations: A three-country comparative study. London: Sage.
Hovels, Ben W. M., and Peter Nas. 1976. Ondernemingsraden en Medezeggenschap.
Nijmegen: Instituut voor Toegepaste Sociologie.
Hueting, Ernst, Fritz de Jong Edz, and Rob Ney. 1985. Naar groter eenheid: De geschie-
denis van het FNV. Amsterdam: van Gennep.
Huiskamp, Rien J., and R. J. Risseeuw. 1988. Ondernemingsraad en arbeidsvoorwaar-
den: Een onderzoek naar de ml van de OR bij het tot stand komen van de primaire
arbeidsvoorwaarden. Amsterdam: Economisch-Sociaal Instituut-Vrije Universiteit.113 The Netherlands: From Paternalism to Representation
IB FNV (Industriebond Federatie Nederlandse Vakbewiging). 1979. De Industriebond-
FNV in het bedrijf. Amsterdam: Industriebond Federatie Nederlandse Vakbewiging.
. 1980. Verder Kijken. Amsterdam: Industriebond Federatie Nederlandse Vakbe-
wiging.
-. 1990. VGW in profiel. Amsterdam: Industriebond Federatie Nederlandse Vak-
bewiging.
IDE. (Industrial Democracy in Europe). 1981. Oxford: Clarendon.
Klandermans, Bert, Sharda Nadram, Bas van der Putte, Coen van Rij, Wim Saris, Gerite
van der Veen, and Jelle Visser. 1992. Participatie in vakbonden: Een opiniepeiling
onder CNV- en FNV-leden. Amsterdam: Nederlands Instituut voor Markt- en
Maatschappij Onderzoek.
Koene, Anneke M., and Hans Slomp. 1990. Medezeggenschap van werknemers op ond-
ernemingsniveau: Een onderzoek naar regels en hun toepassing in zes Europese Ian-
den. The Hague: VUGA.
Koning, Frank. 1991. Rechtspraakmedezeggenschapsrecht. Sociaal MaandbladArbeid
46(3): 171-84.
Lammers, Cornelis J. 1968. De ondernemingsraad als beleidsinstrument: Sociologische
beschouwingen naar aanleiding van enkele onderzoeks-resultaten. Mens en Onder-
neming 22(1): 24-43.
. 1974. Self-management and participation: Two conceptions of democratization
of organizations. Organization and Administration Sciences 5(4): 17-33.
Looise, Jan C. 1989. The recent growth in employees' representation in the Nether-
lands: Defying the times? In International handbook of participation in organis-
ations, vol. 1, Organisational democracy: Taking stock, ed. C. J. Lammers and G.
Szell, 268-84. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Looise, Jan C, and F. G. M. de Lange. 1987. Ondernemingsraden, bestuurders en bes-
luitvorming. Nijmegen: Instituut voor Toegepaste Sociologie.
Looise, Jan C, and Jan Z. Heijink. 1986. De OR en zijn bevoegdheden. Interim-rapport
OR-onderzoek. Nijmegen: Instituut voor Toegepaste Sociologie.
Pool, Jan, Pieter J. D. Drenth, Paul L. Koopman, and Cornelis J. Lammers. 1988. De
volwassenwording van de medezeggenschap: Invloeds-verhoudingen in de jaren
tachtig. Gedrag en Organisatie 3(1): 36-57.
Pool, Jan, Paul L. Koopman, and A. A. Mijs. 1991. Invloed en medezeggenschap na
tien jaar no nonsensemanagement: Een replicatiestudie in drie bedrijfstakken.
Tijdschrift voor Arbeidsvraagstukken 7(2): 54-66.
Schuit, Steven R., Marcel Romyn, Gerrit H. Zevenboom, and Michael W. den Boogert.
1988. Dutch business law: Legal, accounting and tax aspects of doing business in
the Netherlands. 3d ed. Kluwer Law and Taxation. Deventer: Kluwer.
Smid, Gerhard, Wim Sprenger, and Jelle Visser. 1979. Vakbondswerk moet je leren.
Amsterdam: Socialistische Uitgeverij Amsterdam.
Teulings, Ad. 1981. Ondernemingsraadpolitiek in Nederland: Een onderzoek naar de
omgang met macht en conflict door de ondernemingsraad. Amsterdam: van Gennep.
. 1985. Prominenten en volgers: Recht, macht en invloed van ondernemingsra-
den op de besluitvorming. Tijdschrift voor Arbeidsvraagstukken 1(1): 51-64.
-. 1989. A political bargaining theory of co-determination. In The state, trade
unions and self-management: Issues of competence and control, ed. G. Szell, P. Bly-
ton, and C. Cornforth, 75-101. New York: de Gruyter.
van der Berg, G. 1924. De medezeggenschap der arbeiders in de particuliere ondernem-
ing. Thesis, University of Amsterdam.
Van der Heijden, Paul F. 1991. De volwassen ondernemingsraad. Sociaal Maandblad
Arbeid 46: 692-98.
van der Putte, Bas, Jelle Visser, and Coen van Rij. 1991. De vakbond in het bedrijf.
Amsterdam: Nederlands Instituut voor Markt- en Maatschappij Onderzoek.114 Jelle Visser
van Haren, Ivo. 1985. De geschiedenis van de medezeggenschap in Nederland. De-
venter: Kluwer.
van Hees, Bert. 1993. Bedrijfsmatige aspooten van vakbonden en ondernemingsraden.
Lou vain/Apeldoorn: Garant.
van Rhijn, I. A. W., and Rien J. Huiskamp. 1989. Vergelijken.de analyse van vakbonds-
groepen in bedrijven. Amsterdam: Economisch-Sociaal Instituut-Vrije Universiteit.
van Vliet, G. E. 1979. Bedrijvenwerk als vorm van belangenbehartiging. Alphen a/d
Rijn: Samson.
van Vuuren, C. V., and Paul L. Koopman. 1986. Medezeggenschap door de ondernem-
ingsraad nieuwe stijl. Tijdschrift voor Arbeidsvraagstukken 2(1): 50-62.
Visser, Jelle. 1989. New working-time arrangements and policies in the Netherlands. In
Current issues in labor relations: An international perspective, ed. Alan Gladstone,
Russell Lansbury, Jack Stieber, Tiziano Treu, and Manfred Weiss, 229-52. New York:
de Gruyter.
. 1990. Continuity and change in Dutch industrial relations. In European indus-
trial relations: The challenge of flexibility, ed. Guido Baglioni and Colin Crouch,
199-243. London, Newbury Park, New Delhi: Sage.
1991a. Employee representation in West European workplaces: Structure,
scale, scope and strategy. Paper prepared for the 3d European regional congress of
the Industrial Relations Research Association.
-. 1991b. Trends in trade union membership. In Employment outlook July 1991,
97-134. Paris: Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development.
-. 1992a. The coming divergence in Dutch industrial relations. In Labor relations
in a changing environment, ed. A. Gladstone et al., 251-66. New York: de Gruyter.
-. 1992b. The end of an era and the end of an system. In Industrial relations in
the new Europe, ed. R. Hyman and A. Ferner, 323-56. Oxford: Blackwell.
Visser, Jelle, and B. Ebbinghaus. 1992. Making the most of diversity? European inte-
gration and transnational organization of labor. In Interests organization and the Eu-
ropean Community, ed. J. Greenwood, J. Grote, and K. Ronit, 206-37. London: Sage.
Windmuller, John P. 1969. Labor relations in the Netherlands. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press.